On Rawls and liberal equality

(Draft Copy)

According to John Rawls, justice is the first virtue of institutions, as truth is of systems of thought (Rawls 1971, 3). Rawls, who belongs to the social contract tradition, develops his theory of justice from what he calls the original position, a device in which all parties choose the principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance deems that people do not know their status in society. Thus, they are essentially blind to all facts about their lives that might affect what notion of justice they would agree. Rawls states:

No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance (Ibid.).

The veil of ignorance ensures fairness in choosing the principles of justice which must apply to social arrangements. Rawls says, “they are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association” (Ibid.)

This contract or agreement is hypothetical in nature. Rawls argues that these principles are in fact what the parties would agree upon if they were in that hypothetical situation of the original position. Rawls explains this by calling upon us “to imagine a state of nature where we are blind as to our status or position in society” (Ibid.). This includes, for all members of society, not knowing where one would end up or which fortunes one gets in the natural lottery. Under this veil of ignorance, the position of equality is guaranteed. It ensures that those who might be able to influence the process in their favor, due to their better position, are unable to do so (Kymlicka 2007, 63).

This initial status quo is meant to emphasize on the equality of human beings as moral persons (Ibid.). This means that individuals must be responsible for their judgments and actions but not for the situations or circumstances beyond them, for instance, nationality, gender, and race. There must be just distribution of social primary goods since equal opportunity does not fully compensate for the unequal circumstances men and women are born into. Thus, Rawls says:

Human beings should have the same initial expectations of "basic goods," i.e., all-purpose goods; this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of such goods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions and actions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basic freedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill two provisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices and positions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous ‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possible advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, 5).

Since the moral equality of all parties is ensured, Rawls argues that people would adopt two principles of justice in the hypothetical contract. These two principles, the priority of liberty and the difference principle, would then govern the social arrangement, including how certain rights, duties, social and economic opportunities are to be distributed. The two principles of justice are: First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second, that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that, a) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and b) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

The first principle, or the autonomy principle, suggests that the liberty of the individual is inviolable. The liberty principle is supreme and cannot be violated for the sake of the second principle. This is because the autonomy or liberty of the individual essentially constitutes his moral value. No person, in this sense, can be sacrificed for the sake of another good nor can a person be used as means to further another end. Meaning to say, personal liberty means that the person is an end in itself. Each individual in a free society can pursue a life plan and profit from the same. A liberal state guarantees the autonomy of each person, but he or she must not undermine the liberty of others nor exploit others to his or her advantage.

The second principle, the fair opportunity principle and the difference principle, considers how social primary goods like income, opportunity, and the basis of self-respect, can be distributed from a just social arrangement. First, Rawls says that government instrumentalities, i.e. offices, elections, must be open to all under the fair terms of cooperation. This means that every person must have the chance to take advantage of the benefits or advantages that the institutions of government can make available. This includes, among others, the right to run for office. Secondly, it is the worst off in society who must be favored primarily to make the sharing of social primary goods fair. The worst off refers to those who are disadvantaged in society, for instance, members of poor communities, those who belong to cultural minorities, or the individuals in sectors which are vulnerable due to their social condition, i.e. poverty, conflict, etc. They must be considered, for instance, by way of taxation which should provide the basic services to help them. People can pursue their life-plans and profit from the same, but they must contribute through taxes to serve the worst off, so that the worst off may have the opportunity to improve their lives. This is what the famous difference principle calls for. People can still pursue wealth, but this must not make the position of the disadvantaged more difficult. Fairness in the liberal sense therefore means that justice is served when we treat people as equals, “not by removing all inequalities, but only those which disadvantage the worst off” (Kymlicka 2007, 55).

Equality in the liberal sense therefore means that each person’s liberty is construed as morally significant and inviolable. Thus, any person who may have an advantage in view of his talent can still pursue his life-plans as long as the inequality brought about by a person’s abilities ultimately favors the worst off.

If a person gains more income say from being a manager of a bank, the inequality is not necessarily unjust if his access to more income serves the interests of his clients, who in turn must also serve the interest of their consumers, most of which could belong to the worst off, whom they must sell goods at a fair price. Or for example, if a person invests his shares from social primary goods and earns some profit, there is no injustice if people benefit from his investments, say from gainful employment. Entitlement to the profit that one’s basic liberties allow, granting such profit is not acquired nor used to the disadvantage of the worst off, forms as the firm foundation of liberal equality.

For instance, to hire someone because one is more qualified in terms of skill does not do an injustice to a co-applicant. But to hire someone because the company prefers white people is not just for it suggests that white people are always better than colored people. In the same manner, for instance in a case which actually happened in the state of New Orleans District Attorney’s Office, replacing all white people with blacks is biased and unjust. Whereas an appropriate competency or skill would be beneficial to society’s well-being as a whole, bias against people because of their color obviously does not.

According to Will Kymlicka, liberal equality follows from what Rawls calls the maximin strategy. Say, for instance, we have situations A, B, and C for three people who are given the following amount of goods: A – 10,000:8,000:1,000; B – 7,000:6,000:2,000; C – 5,000:4,000:4,000. Since people do not know where they will end up in the just distribution, one should maximize his or her chances of getting an adequate amount of goods and minimize the risks of getting into the bottom. In this case, it would be rational to choose C, for it maximizes your chances and your risks are little if you end up getting the minimum. A is a form of oligarchy, where there are two sectors or perhaps families in society enriching themselves unabatedly, and making use of the less well off. B does not fare better, for there’s still a huge gap, and since nobody knows where one would end up, nobody would agree to such a condition. C seems to show that there is some form of inequality, but such can be compensated by the fact that the less well-off at least possesses a chance to catch up, given the fact that the rich is not too rich to usurp everybody, and that the poor is not too poor that life in such a way would seem hopeless.

Critique of Liberal Equality

Liberal equality is not a perfect design. For instance, following Ronald Dworkin, it can be argued that the difference principle accounts only for disadvantages in terms of social primary goods and neglects natural disadvantages like mental disabilities (See Ibid., 59). Dworkin says that even if social primary goods are redistributed, those with disabilities will still be disadvantaged because of their condition. Thus, for Dworkin a certain form of insurance must first be provided to those with natural disabilities before the resources of society are auctioned off. Justice as fairness demands in this sense that it must be endowment sensitive. This will ensure that the distribution of resource will not be biased to those with natural disabilities.

It is also important to point out that people, being free, can waste their fair share due to bad choices. But it is also argued in the text that it is equally unjust for one to demand that someone else pay for the cost of one’s choices simply because one has misappropriated what has been allocated to him/her as his/her fair share. Thus, the difference principle must be ambition-sensitive. Here, Will Kymlicka makes the analogy of the tennis player and the gardener who are provided with the same resource, the former opting for leisure while the latter wisely investing the said resource through hardwork.

We can improve on his analogy by citing a real world example instead. Say Pupil A and Pupil B go to the same public school – Pupil A drops out whereas Pupil B succeeds. Let’s find out why. Ambition-sensitivity is an important account, but I am using a real world example to be more reflective of reality. I would like to say that it is a fact that there is a great imbalance in terms of access to society’s resource. Much is invested in private education by way of grants, tuitions, endowments, but, like in our country, so little is put into public education, creating a huge disparity in terms of the kind of education received by rich and poor children.

Evidence suggests that there are more drop outs in public schools than in private schools. Both Pupil A and Pupil B go to the same public school, but it is a fact that Pupil A might fail although they are given the same resource in the same manner as both the tennis player and gardener were given the same resource. Why? The reason is that basic needs may not even be adequate in the first place! What Dworkin emphasizes in the idea of ambition sensitivity is that individuals must be responsible for the goods allocated for them.

Morever, it can also be argued that the idea of making profit is an immediate challenge to liberal equality. The idea of profit is compatible with any property-owning democratic state. One has to admit that making profit happens in any liberal state. But how much profit must a liberal state allow? What is the extent by which we allow the margin of inequality by way of a profit-making economy? It can be argued that it is just for companies to gain profit, for such allows business to flourish, and thus people employed can continue to earn and live a good life. If invested, such profit allows for further employment, thus maximizing the company’s potential and helping people realize their life plans.

There is no provision in the difference principle as to how profit can be controlled. Oil price increases and their resulting windfall for big oil companies are unjust if it makes the public suffer, although they justify that it is needed for the business to do more projects. But failing to account for what constitutes a just and ethically desirable profit in a democratic state is a huge gap that needs to be addressed. For it needs to be asked how do we ensure that those who make profit in any liberal state will not usurp others and exploit those who are worst off.

Fairness is discussed generally in terms of equality of opportunity, which suggests that a bigger income is deserved as long as there has been fair competition (See Ibid., 57). But such notion of fair competition can put those who do not possess high intelligence or skill at a disadvantage. The concept of fair competition is deceptive because others have natural talents they do not deserve to possess if we put premium in the moral equality of persons. The central argument of Rawls then is that all social arrangements, to be fair, should ultimately favor the worst off, whose disadvantage, say in their social position or natural talent is something they don’t deserve.

So how is liberal egalitarianism attained in view of social inequality? Liberal theorists focus on the second principle of justice – the difference principle. This principle provides for the basis of a theory of just redistribution. Why redistribute the resources of society? The argument for this is that I believe if the rich are left on their own, chances are they will be using the worst off to advance their interests.

Justice as fairness ensures that enough opportunities are available to the worst-off. How is this done? For Rawls, this means removing inequalities which disadvantage people by giving them a just share of the social primary goods. As an example, a landlord who gains 60 percent of the share of harvests is simply taking advantage of a farmer who gains only 40 percent out of which he will also have to pay for farm implements, fertilizers, etc. apart from the fact that he is the one who tills the land. This form of inequality is unacceptable. To remove this form of injustice, a democratic state can implement land reform.

In terms of professions, it is not unfair for a nurse to receive a lesser salary than a doctor for the doctor has spent greater deal of his time and energy to gain his expertise. But it is also not fair for a doctor to demand excessive fees. The reason is that unreasonable fees means taking advantage of the plight of his patients. The fact that excellent medical service in developing countries is affordable only to those who belong in the upper economic class is an injustice. This contradicts the argument that inequalities can be allowed if and only if they contribute to society’s well-being as a whole.

Another argument to enhance the meaning of liberal equality is the critique of primary social goods as basis for human well-being in welfare economics. The distribution of resources in terms of income only touches the superficial symptoms of poverty but does not address the differences and heterogeneties between two people. For instance, person A and B can have the same amount of income. But if person A is a person with a physical handicap, there is no real equality though they have the same amount of income. The difference principle is good, but not good enough (Simon 2006). For Sen, equality must be based on equality of capabilities, or the substantive (positive) freedoms of people. The income approach only addresses the poverty of income but not the poverty of human life. Unjust social arrangements diminish the capabilities of people, and as such, re-arranging the mode of social cooperation therefore entails looking at holistic approaches to development. For instance, if we consider those with natural disabilities, it is not income that they need but a sense of human well-being beyond what economic provisions provide. This can be done by advancing their cause through massive investments in education and health care. It is not enough to talk about dividing social primary goods. It is equally important that in the allocation of such, basic capability enhancement through education, health care, and protection from human rights abuse are provided for.